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Learning to Manage the Army
Edward Ward, Halford Mackinder and the Army Administration Course at 
the London School of Economics, 1907-1914
Peter Grant
 
In his recent article on the Army Administration Course at the London School of 
Economics (LSE), Sloan rightly hails the course as ‘a radical experiment in British 
military education.’1 Sloan’s article is in many ways comprehensive and is especially 
good on the role played in the course by the LSE’s Director, Halford Mackinder. 
However, Sloan gives insuicient coverage to two respects. First is the highly signii-
cant contribution to the development of the course that was made by the Permanent 
Secretary at the War Oice, Sir Edward Ward, second, is the far-reaching inlu-
ence the course had on later thinking beyond the conines of the British Army. Sloan 
incorrectly describes Ward as the Under-Secretary of State for War, an error a number 
of other sources also make. Ward had assumed the permanent secretary role in 1901. 
Seen as a stage towards the establishment of separate business schools within British 
universities, this revolutionary course in educating military personnel in business and 
administrative topics at higher degree level also acted as a precursor for later busi-
ness related university education alongside similar LSE-inspired courses for those in 
banking and the railways.
Often cited as the greatest of Britain’s peacetime holders of the post of Secretary 
of State for War, Richard Burton Haldane’s modernisation of the War Oice was 
‘little short of revolutionary.’2 During the reforms of 1905 to 1912, Haldane relied on 
the assistance of a number of military experts and their contribution, most notably 
1 Geof Sloan, ‘Haldane’s Mackindergarten: A Radical Experiment in British Military 
Education’, War in History, 19 (3) (2012), p.351.
2 Simon Higgens, ‘How was Richard Haldane able to reform the British Army? An 
historical assessment using a contemporary change management model’, (MPhil hesis, 
University of Birmingham, 2010), p.68; K.W. Mitchinson, Defending Albion: Britain’s 
Home Army 1908-1919 (Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2005), p.3. See also R. Blake, 
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Major-General Douglas Haig.3 One igure whose contribution to the Haldane 
Reforms has been underplayed (even totally forgotten) was the Permanent Secretary at 
the War Oice during that period, Sir Edward Ward. Ward was a former army supply 
oicer, it was his ingenuity that ensured the survival of the garrison and civilians of 
Ladysmith during the siege, and organiser of the Royal Military Tournament who, 
after retirement, went on to become Director General of Voluntary Organisations 
during the Great War.4 During the war Ward also headed the Camps Library that 
supplied books to the troops, was an extremely active Chairman of the Council of the 
RSPCA, Honorary Treasurer and member of the General Purposes Committee of the 
West Indian Contingent Committee (which looked after the welfare of West Indian 
and Bermudan troops), Assistant Inspector of Shells for the Ministry of Munitions 
and Commandant-in-Chief of the Metropolitan Special Constabulary.
he Role of Sir Edward Ward
Haldane had great faith in Ward and gave him signiicant additional responsibili-
ties. Ward was a key igure in many critical improvements to the War Oice as he 
brought his organisational and managerial skills to bear. Haldane often relied on 
advice from key specialists and, in this case, his chosen specialist advisor was Ward 
who had irst made proposals along similar lines in 1903-04 during the attempted 
reforms of Haldane’s predecessor, H.O. Arnold-Foster, which envisaged the creation 
of an entirely new class of reserve oicer.5 Teargarden suggests that Haldane’s ‘greatest 
asset as Secretary of State was his profound ignorance on military matters. He was 
therefore able to form an independent judgement.’6 However, Higgins debunks the 
idea of Haldane’s complete ignorance on military matters suggesting this was a delib-
erate ‘cover’ in order to woo the top Generals to his way of thinking.7 From May 
1906, Ward chaired the weekly Directors meetings with important operational issues 
discussed and actions decided. Like several other key Army oicers, including Haig, 
Ward shared Haldane’s views on the need for signiicant reform and reorganisation 
to turn the Army into a modern ighting force. Ward threw himself enthusiastically 
into these tasks, which included oicer recruitment, plans for mobilisation and the 
‘Great Britain: he Crimean War to the First World War’ in Michael Howard (ed.) 
Soldiers and Governments (London, Eyre and Spottiswode, 1957), p.34.
3 Most recently in Gary Sheield’s he Chief: Douglas Haig and the British Army (London, 
Aurum Press, 2011), pp.58-60.
4 For a full examination of Ward’s innovative military and managerial career, see: Peter 
Grant, Philanthropy and Voluntary Action in the First World War (London: Routledge, 2014).
5 he National Archives (TNA), WO 32/6384, Report of Ward Committee on 
Organisation and Establishment of Civil Departments 1903. 
6 Ernest Teagarden, Haldane at the War Oice: A Study in Organization and Management 
(New York, Gordon Press, 1976), p.26.
7 Higgins, ‘Richard Haldane’, pp.52-56, 71-72.
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re-organisation of the Army Medical Department and that of the War Oice itself. 
Between 1907 and 1909, Ward created the framework of the Imperial General Staf 
that came into existence in November 1909 and was Chairman of the Committee on 
Civil Employment of Ex-Soldiers and Sailors, a cause close to his heart and demon-
strating his keen humanitarian concern.8 Another of Ward’s achievements was the 
creation of the Oicers Training Corps (OTC) that Haldane recognised as Ward’s 
brainchild by making him the chair of the committee in August 1906.9 Ward was 
responsible for the compilation of the original ‘War Book’, which set out, in detail, 
the actions required on mobilization. hough it was later revised, it was on Ward’s 
basic plan that subsequent versions were based and the fact that mobilization went so 
smoothly in 1914 was partly a testimony to Ward’s organisational skills. In 1908-09, 
he worked with Haig, now Director of Staf Duties, on the production of ‘a codiied 
set of manuals dealing with administration and training’ that became Field Service 
Regulations Parts 1 and 2. Williams noted that, ‘It was very largely his [Ward’s] hand 
which guided Mr Haldane in his eforts to create the Expeditionary Force and the 
Territorial Force between 1906 and 1908.’ hough written in the 1960s, Williams, 
unlike many others, is not a Haig critic and so it is unlikely he deliberately over-
played Ward’s contribution.10 In 1908, Ward authored the Territorial Force Regulations 
and became Honorary Colonel of the 2nd London Territorial Division. He was also 
Chairman of the County of London Territorial Force Association.
Between them, the Haldane reforms transformed the War Oice into ‘a form so 
efective that it remained substantially unchanged for seventy years…he new organi-
sation was reminiscent of the board of directors in a modern service company.’11 In 
other words, Haldane, Ward and their collaborators were bringing to bear innova-
tive business techniques to the ield of military management. his was in a period 
when modern management theory was in its infancy. he ideas of American Frederick 
Winslow Taylor were beginning to be known, and were included in the LSE Course. 
However, Ward’s ideas in particular were closer to those of the French pioneer of 
modern management theory, Henri Fayol. Tadman suggests that:
8 Colonel G. Williams, Citizen Soldiers of the Royal Engineers Transportation and Movements 
and the Army Service Corps 1859-1965 (Ashford, Royal Corps of Transport, 1965), p.33.
9 Peter Simkins, Kitchener’s Army: he Raising of the New Armies, 1914-1916 (Manchester, 
Manchester University Press, 1988), p 12; Ian Worthington, ‘Socialization, Militarization 
and Oicer Recruiting: he Development of the Oicers Training Corps’, Military Afairs, 
43 (2) (April 1979), pp.90-96.
10 Williams, Citizen Soldiers of the Royal Engineers, p.26, 33.
11 Michael Tadman, ‘he War Oice: A Study of its Development as an Organisational 
System, 1870-1904’, (PhD hesis, King’s College London, 1992), pp.240-256.
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…these advances in their appreciation of management principles paralleled the 
work of the great theorists [notably Taylor and Fayol] quite closely, except for this 
vital diference – that they anticipated the published works by several decades.12 
Fayol’s ideas rather than Taylor’s have stood the test of time. Wren concludes that:
…much of the present-day management literature has been built on Fayol’s ideas 
and terminology that it is diicult to see the uniqueness of his insights. For 
his time and in the context of the paucity of management literature, his ideas 
were fresh, illuminating, and milestones on the path of the evolving discipline 
of management.13 
Tadman directly links the thinking that characterised the reforms overseen by Lord 
Esher, Haldane and Ward as directly comparable to Fayol’s principles of good manage-
ment. Most of all Ward had the conviction, like Fayol, that future senior managers 
should receive specialist managerial education and training.14 Higgens too recognises 
the mechanisms of Haldane’s reforms as mirroring modern management techniques 
by demonstrating that what was at work was a classic ‘change management process’ 
predicated upon Haldane’s deep interest in Hegelian philosophy. Higgens concludes 
that Haldane ‘understood the intellectual complexities of institutional change’, it is 
clear that in his many, and varied roles Ward shared the same understanding.15
In all of the above tasks, Ward utilised his previous administrative experience 
from service in the ield in Ashanti and South Africa as well as his organisation of 
the Royal Military Tournament, putting forward practical managerial solutions to 
issues that had eluded others. Hailed, as the ‘Saviour of Ladysmith’ for his organisa-
tion of supplies during the siege, Ward, as head of the Tournament, was responsible 
for the tripling of proits. Ward’s belief in sound management and business training 
was prominent in many of the areas under his auspices. However, in one scheme in 
particular these principles were taken a stage further, again anticipating much of the 
later work of management theorists; this was the creation of the Army Administration 
Course at LSE. 
12 Tadman ‘he War Oice’, p.261. 
13 Daniel Wren, he History of Management hought, Second Edition (New York: John Wiley, 
2005), p.218. 
14 For further close similarities between Ward’s and Fayol’s ideas, see: Ward, Supply and 
Transport on Active Service (Dublin, Sibley and Co, 1893), p.11. Also see papers by two of 
his protégés from the LSE course: Oscar Striedinger, ‘Army Organisation’, Army Service 
Corps Quarterly, 3 (1909), pp.365-369, and, especially, Major E.E. Carter, ‘he Science and 
Art of Army Administration’, Army Service Corps Quarterly, 3 (1909), pp.370-379.
15 Higgens. ‘Richard Haldane’, abstract.
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he Creation of the Army Administration Course
As part of Haldane’s extensive reforms, one of the main aims was the creation of an 
administrative staf for the War Oice and Army separate from the General Staf 
but with the same ‘real and far-reaching’ strategic control as the General Staf.16 he 
subsequent LSE course is, like the creation of the OTC, credited to Haldane, espe-
cially as he was a founder of the LSE.17 his is only partially correct; Ward was as 
much the initiator as Haldane. Ward had been an administrative oicer himself for 
almost 30 years, so this was his specialist subject; Ward had espoused many of the 
principles behind the course as early as 1893 and he put forward the idea for the 
scheme in a memorandum entitled ‘he need for a trained administrative staf’ in 
February 1906.18 Clearly though, both men were of the same view on the topic and 
in the paper, ‘Ward propounded the then revolutionary idea that modern soldiers 
needed training in modern administrative techniques.’19 Ward enclosed a draft for 
a three-year staf training course, of which six months were to be spent on account-
ancy, commercial methods, public administration and inance, production and trade, 
railway administration and transport and commercial and international law. he inal 
scheme combined Haldane’s aim with Ward’s belief that management principles 
needed to be inculcated throughout the administration of both the War Oice and 
the army. Ward was one of the irst to apply business methods in Whitehall, some 
nine years before Lloyd-George utilised similar principles in his wartime coalition, 
and the irst to introduce management training for civil servants and the armed forces. 
Ward and Haldane’s conviction that business methods were needed place them 
within the broader movement for national eiciency that gained credibility after the 
Boer War. his movement had been vindicated by the failures of the army in South 
Africa and the enquiries after it, which concluded that major changes were needed. 
During the Boer War itself, he Times correspondent, Leopold Amery demanded, 
‘nothing less than a revolution’ in army organisation and administration. Britain 
needed an expert army, one in which: 
16 Edward M Spiers Haldane: An Army Reformer (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 
1980), p.151.
17 Ibid.
18 Ward, Supply and Transport, pp.18 and 25-26; TNA, WO 163/746, Minutes of 
proceedings of the Permanent Executive Committee of the War Oice (5 January to 4 
March 1904) and Important Treasury and War Oice Decisions 1904-1906.
19 D.C. Watt, ‘he London University Class for Military Administrators 1906-31: A Study 
of the British Approach to Civil-Military Relations’, LSE Quarterly, 2 (2) (Summer 1988), 
pp.157-158.
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…the whole caste system the whole idea of the Army as a sort of puppet show 
where smartness, guilt braid… must vanish and give place to something real, 
something business like.20 
Amery’s comments gained oicial support in the recommendations of the Committee 
on the Reorganisation of the War Oice in 1901, chaired by Clinton Dawkins, a 
partner in the American banking irm of J.P. Morgan.21 Guided mainly by their public 
experience the committee concluded that:
A general, if not a precise analogy, can be established between the conduct of 
large business undertakings and that of the War Oice. here are certain well-
deined principles of management in all well-conducted business corporations, 
and the more closely the War Oice can be brought into conformity with such 
principles, the more successful will be its administration.22
Among the ideas, the Committee considered transferable were the division of work 
into well-deined sections; adequate delegation and decentralisation of powers; efec-
tive systems that avoided excessive form illing and providing adequate, co-ordination 
between departments; all principles that remain pertinent in modern management 
practice.
he movement for national eiciency was led by the former Liberal Prime Minister 
Lord Rosebery, who had been advocating the need for Britain to be put on a business 
footing since the 1880s. Other prominent Liberals and left-of-centre igures including 
Haldane, Halford Mackinder, the polymath Director of LSE, closely associated with 
the development of geopolitical theory, and the Fabians Sidney and Beatrice Webb, 
who along with Haldane had helped establish the LSE, supported it. Drawing on a 
wider political consensus was the dining club the ‘Co-Eicients’ formed by Leopold 
Amery and Beatrice Webb in November 1902 to air strategies that could be used 
to promote national eiciency. While it lasted, it disbanded in 1908 over disagree-
ments around tarif reform; the grouping included those previously mentioned plus Sir 
Edward Grey, Clinton Dawkins, Bertrand Russell, H.G. Wells and George Bernard 
Shaw.23
20 J. Barnes and D. Nicholson, (eds.), he Leo Amery Diaries, 1896-1929, (London, 
Hutchinson, 1980), p.33.
21 1901 [Cmd. 580 and 581] Report of the Committee on War Oice Organisation appointed by 
the Secretary of State for War, 1901, p.xl. 
22 [Cmd. 580] Committee on War Oice Organisation, pp.2-3.
23 W. Funnell, ‘National Eiciency, Military Accounting and the Business of War’, Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting, 17 (6) (2006), pp.732-733.
The Army Administration Course 1907-1914 105
Halford Mackinder and the Committee
Halford Mackinder had already introduced programmes at the LSE to serve the 
executives of the railway, banking and insurance industries as well as the Indian Civil 
Service. Ward had clearly already discussed the idea of a course with Mackinder and 
Sidney Webb because on the day he drafted his memo he lunched with Mackinder 
who then wrote to Webb saying ‘it is practically certain that the scheme we blocked 
out together will go through.’24 his is a further indication that Ward was at least 
as involved in the scheme’s genesis as was Haldane. In support of the principle of a 
course, an article had appeared in the Journal of the Royal United Service Institution 
the year before written by Captain H.A. Young of the Indian Ordnance Department. 
Young compared the army to, ‘a vast business organisation’ and said that what was 
needed were people who were, ‘businessmen irst, and oicers last.’25 he elements 
of the Geography syllabus for such a course had also been developed by the then 
Colonel H.S.G. Miles and A.J. Herbotson in the latter’s article in the Geographical 
Journal and in a letter Sidney Webb described Ward’s contribution to the course as 
‘indispensable’.26
he scheme received the oicial go-ahead six months later and immediately there-
after, an advisory board was established under Ward’s chairmanship. Its senior mili-
tary member was Director of Staf Duties, Lieutenant-General H.D. Hutchinson 
who was replaced a year later by Douglas Haig when he took up that post. he 
other military members were Director of Supplies, Brigadier-General Frederick 
Clayton (later Inspector-General of Communications in France during the war); 
Director of Recruiting and Organization, Major-General H.S.G. Miles; Director 
of Fortiications and Works, Brigadier-General R.M. Ruck and Commandant of 
the Ordnance College at Woolwich, Colonel G.R. Townsend. Civilian members in 
addition to Mackinder and Webb were the General Manager of the London and 
North Western Railway, Sir Frederick Harrison, Sir Hugh Bell, a steel manufacturer 
from Middlesbrough, and the Governor of the Union of London and Smith’s Bank 
Sir Felix Schuster. Others who later served on the committee included several who 
featured in prominent roles during the war including Generals Henry Wilson, in his 
24 B.W. Blouet, Halford Mackinder: A Biography (College Station Texas, A&M University 
Press, 1987), p.131. Watt ‘he London University Class’, p.158. Kreis points out that 
railway workshop were one place where scientiic management had made considerable 
progress in Britain before 1914. Steven Kreis, ‘he Difusion of an Idea: A History of 
Scientiic Management in Britain, 1890-1945’, (PhD hesis, University of Missouri-
Columbia, 1990).
25 Captain H. Young, ‘Practical Economy in the Army’, Journal of the Royal United Service 
Institution, Vol. 50 ( July to December 1906), pp.1281-1285.
26 A.J. Herbotson ‘he Geographical Training of Army Oicers in the Universities’, 
Geographical Journal, 21 (1903), pp.465-6; Bodleian Library, Papers of Percy Noble, MSS 
Autogr, C. 17, No. 495, Letter from Webb to Ward, 23 December, 1910.
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capacity as Commandant of the Staf College, Launcelot Kiggell, later Haig’s Chief 
of Staf, and William Robertson, Chief of the Imperial General Staf for the majority 
of the war. Wilson was about the only senior oicer to criticise the course because 
it would ‘do an ininity of harm’ to the Staf College and ‘a complete separation of 
the Administrative and General Staf.’27 Bell, Mackinder, Shuster and Webb served 
throughout the eight years of the course, Mackinder remaining on the Committee 
after his resignation from the Directorship of the LSE. Mackinder was persuaded to 
resign and take up politics full time by Leo Amery and Lord Milner. He subsequently 
became Unionist MP for Glasgow Camlachie from 1910 to 1922.28 he committee 
members appear to have got on well and often dined together, Haig being a frequent, 
and perhaps unlikely, guest of the Webb’s.29
he Army Administration Course
hough Ward would have liked to have a period of business training that lasted a 
full three years it was unrealistic for oicers to remove themselves from the pros-
pects of promotion for this length of time and so the inal agreement was for a six-
month course.30 he military correspondent of he Times, Charles a Court Repington, 
who also thought the course should be extended to selected General Staf oicers, 
supported Ward.31 he irst course ran from January to July 1907, with the second 
following from October 1907 to March 1908. Six further courses ran annually from 
October to March and in total 245 oicers, mainly of the rank of Captain and Major, 
attended the course from all branches of the army with the exception of the cavalry. 
he absence of cavalry oicers is not explained in any of the sources but may be 
connected with the structure of careers in that arm. Additionally, a small number 
of oicers from the reserve list who attended at their own expense. his explains a 
proportion of the ‘Other’ listed in Table 1 opposite.
Addressing the opening day of the initial course Mackinder expressed the view that:
he Army is the greatest single business in this country… It is true, of course, 
that it is necessarily conducted on a diferent principle from ordinary city busi-
ness. he Army is not conducted for proit, but to produce power. his power is 
used during peace time in order to maintain peace, and in war time to achieve 
victory.32
27 Sloan ‘Haldane’s Mackindergarten’, p.331.
28 Blouet, Halford Mackinder, p.138.
29 Spiers, Haldane, p.151.
30 Watt, ‘he London University Class’, pp.162-163.
31 ‘Military Notes, he Times, 30 October 1906, p.15.
32 1907 [Cmd. 3696] Report of the Advisory Board, London School of Economics, on the First 
Course at the London School of Economics, January to July, 1907, for the Training of Oicers 
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Table 1 Percentage of Participants in the LSE Army Administrative Course 1907-1914
Branch Course 
1
Course 
2
Course 
3
Course 
4
Course 
5
Course 
6
Course 
7
Course 
8
ASC 39 43 47 37 32 26 23 31
Infantry 26 23 23 37 29 35 37 28
Artillery 16 13 17 13 10  9 10  6
Ordnance 10 10 10 10 19 19 13 10
Indian  3  3  3 –  6  9 10  9
RE  6  3 – – – – – –
Other –  3 – –  3 –  7  6
Total numbers 
on each course
31 30 30 30 31 31 30 32
Mackinder noted that it was only recently that those in business had recognised the 
importance of professional training but that:
What the railways, and what the city, among its more enlightened representa-
tives, is beginning to feel is that administration requires a training similar to 
the professional trainings, and that experience, in the face of German and other 
foreign competition, is showing that the old typically British way of blundering 
into the position of a responsible administrator will no longer do.33
So there was recognition both of the novelty of this approach, professional training 
in management being in its infancy in business let alone in the army, and of the ‘threat’ 
that German eiciency posed with its highly trained specialist administrators.
Lectures were given on 14 subjects covering six broader areas: accounting and busi-
ness methods, commercial law, statistics, transport, banking and economics. hey 
were supplemented by numerous ‘observation visits’ to such enterprises as the oices 
of he Times, the Great Western Railway Works, the London Docks, the London 
Omnibus Works, the Railway Clearing House, the Houses of Parliament and Lloyds. 
Eminent experts in their ields who were drawn from business, the universities and 
government instructed students. Haldane was a frequent lecturer and several others 
were politically from the radical wing including Webb, who lectured on the organi-
sation of trade unions, Hastings Lees-Smith, later a Labour Cabinet Minister (on 
economics) and the Fabian Socialist Graham Wallas, one of the seminal igures in the 
development of social science (on public administration).34 Enjoyed by the students, 
for the Higher Appointments on the Administrative Staf of the Army and for the charge of 
Departmental Services, p.11.
33 [Cmd. 3696] Advisory Board Report 1907, p 12.
34 Funnell, ‘National Eiciency ‘, p.736. 
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as one of them wrote ‘as a phrase-maker…[Wallas’ lectures in particular]…ranks with 
Bishop Wilberforce.’35 he course therefore had a radically diferent content to both 
that of the staf oicer course at the Army Staf College Camberley and the War 
Course at the Royal Naval War College, both of which focused on military strategy 
and tactics.36 
At the outset Mackinder told students that the ‘syllabuses are tentative, and not 
yet complete.’37 As would be expected in a new course, the balance of topics adjusted 
as time went on. here was initially rather too much theory, too much history and 
insuicient reference to military problems and so the second course included some 
signiicant changes with increased time given to statistics, public administration and 
marine transportation at the expense of accounting and economic geography.38 By 
the time of the third course a good balance appears to have been struck and the 
only, signiicant change to the curriculum thereafter was that Business Organisation, 
how to structure and organise enterprises for maximum eiciency, became increas-
ingly important. his module included the recognition that ‘business organization is 
organization of the social organism.’39 It emphasised the importance of process and 
the elimination of waste and, from 1912, included study of Frederick Taylor’s ideas, 
which had been published in his book he Principles of Scientiic Management only 
the previous year. his introduced students to theories of management that were at 
the forefront of contemporary thinking. Examination questions covered a range of 
topics that became highly relevant in the future careers of the participants. Examples 
include comparing the inancial resources of Britain, France and Germany in view of 
an outbreak of war (1907), the impact of conscription in wartime (1908), the pros and 
cons of local recruiting for the Army (1910) and the impact on the London market and 
unemployment in the event of a major war (1912 and 1913). As one graduate of the 
course wrote, it taught the importance of structure and process in business methods, 
‘to consider ourselves as tiny cogs and parts of a vast plant of machinery, each mutually 
dependent, mutually working in a great common cause.’40 his esprit d’armee, Airey, 
suggested, should supplement the already existing regimental spirit. he modular 
content of the course mirrors in several respects the content and structure of modern 
Business School syllabi, notably their Executive MBAs.
he course became afectionately known as ‘Haldane’s Mackindergarden’ and its 
immediate impact was to assist the LSE’s inances, allowing them to open a refectory 
35 R.B. Airey, ‘he London School of Economics and the Army’, Army Review, IV (1913), 
p.472.
36 Sloan, ‘Haldane’s Mackindergarten’ p.327; Andrew Lambert, ‘he Naval War Course: 
Some Principals of Maritime Strategy and the Origins of “he British Way in Warfare”‘ 
in Keith Neilson and Greg Kennedy (eds.) he British Way in Warfare: Power and the 
International System, 1856-1956 (Farnham: Ashgate, 2010), pp.219-56.
37 Advisory Board Report 1907 (Cd. 3696), p.12.
38 Watt, ‘he London University Class’, pp.164-165.
39 1912-13 [Cmd. 6285] Report of Sixth Course, 5th October 1911 to 27th March 1912, p.5.
40 Airey, ‘he London School of Economics’, p.468.
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serving all staf and students.41 It also had the signiicant result of widening the 
students’ perspective on the world, including the fact that women too could be intel-
lectuals. ‘he atmosphere at Clare Market is valuable’ Major Airey conirmed. It 
provided ‘social intercourse with men, women and research students … who are all 
so diferent from the average soldier.’42 Lawrence Dicksee, the course’s main account-
ancy lecturer, was in no doubt that, the course signiicantly improved military ei-
ciency and that it was responsible for the ‘wonderful success of transport and supply’ 
in the early part of the war.43 Dicksee became the irst Professor of Accounting at any 
British university, holding the post at the University of Birmingham. hose who went 
through the course became senior administrative oicers during the war and had a 
profound inluence upon the supply and management of the army. Examples include:
•	 G.M. Heath - Chief Engineer for 2nd Corps then 1st Army 1915-16. Engineer 
in Chief GHQ from November 1917.
•	 C.W. Gwynn - Director of Military Artillery with the Australian Army during 
the war. Commandant of the Staf College, Camberley 1926-31. Long has 
described him as ‘One of the outstanding staf oicers of the Army, and in peace 
a notable trainer of future senior commanders.’44
•	 W.A.C. Denny - the irst Director General of Military Intelligence of Canada. 
his appointment may also have been connected with Ward who had a strong link 
with the Canadian forces. He had been an Honorary Colonel of the Canadian 
Army Service Corps since 1904. He was a friend of Sam Hughes the Canadian 
Minister for Militia and Defence during the war and even helped organise Sidney 
and Beatrice Webb’s holiday to that country.45
•	 E.E. Carter - Director of Supplies at GHQ from 1915 until the end of the war. 
he history of the Royal Army Service Corps (RASC) notes that, ‘it was largely 
due to General Carter that the Army was better fed than any other’ during the 
First World War.46
•	 W.K. Tarver - Deputy Director at the War Oice from March 1916. Inspector of 
the RASC from 1925-9 when he became Colonel Commandant of the RASC.
•	 C.D.R. Watts - Assisted in instruction on the LSE course in 1908-9. Director of 
41 he nickname came from the student magazine ‘he Clare Market Review’. Blouet, 
Halford Mackinder, p.132.
42 Airey, ‘he London School of Economics’, p.473.
43 L.R. Dicksee, Business Methods and the War. (Four lectures.), (Cambridge, University Press. 
1915), pp.71-2. 
44 Gavin Long, ‘Gwynn, Sir Charles William (1870–1963)’, Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, National Centre of Biography, Australian National University, http://adb.anu.
edu.au/biography/gwynn-sir-charles-william-6511/text11175, accessed 30 October 2010.
45 M. Young, Army Service Corps (Barnsley, Leo Cooper, 2000), p.23; Percy Noble Papers, Nos. 
145, 147 and 494.
46 Anon, he Short History of the Royal Army Service Corps (Aldershot, Gale and Polden, 
1939), p.59.
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Ordnance Services 1928-31. Colonel Commandant of the Royal Army Ordnance 
Corps from 1932.
•	 F.F. Ready - Adjutant-General in Mesopotamia. General Oicer Commanding 
Northern Ireland District in 1926, before becoming GOC of the 1st Division at 
Aldershot Command in 1929 and then Quartermaster-General to the Forces in 
1931.
One aspect of the war that gets unanimous praise is its logistical administration and 
part of the groundwork for this success was laid in the eight courses of 1907-14. When, 
after the war, the LSE tried to have it resurrected they commented that ‘its value has 
been testiied to be very satisfactory in the War just ended’, and this was a major inlu-
ence in the course’s revival in 1924 under William Beveridge, the then Director of the 
LSE.47 However, the course was inally discontinued in 1932 in the wake of econo-
mies during the Great Depression. Funnell has described the course as ‘amongst the 
most innovative strategies to raise the commercial awareness and accounting expertise 
of army administrators’ and demonstrates how it had a signiicant impact upon the 
eicient operation of the Ministry of Munitions.48 
Conclusion
In his inaugural speech in 1907 Mackinder had stated that what the devisors of the 
course had in mind was ‘to do something more than merely teach and learn; we have 
to evolve a tradition.’49 his view was clearly supported at the highest levels of the 
army as Funnell has commented: 
the creation of an Advisory Board…on which sat some of the most senior oicers 
of the various army departments, was a clear indication of the importance with 
which the army, the War Oice and the government regarded the new Army 
Class.50 
he course demonstrates that many of the senior administrative oicers and several of 
the senior commanders of the First World War, not least Douglas Haig, were well-
versed in modern business management principles, including the latest thinking from 
the United States on scientiic management. It ensured that Britain had a core group 
of middle-ranking oicers with sound administrative training during and after the 
First World War. 
47 Funnell, ‘National Eiciency ‘, p.738.
48 Funnell, ‘National Eiciency ‘, pp.719-720 and p.736.
49 Report of the Advisory Board 1907 (Cd 3696), p.14.
50 Funnell, ‘National Eiciency ‘, p.736.
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Sloan agrees with this assessment and suggests that the course may have inlu-
enced the thinking of Lloyd-George’s government in appointing top civil executives 
like Sir Eric Geddes to key wartime posts.51 Stoddart has summarised the courses as 
providing ‘a precedent for the later university training of Army and Air Force cadets 
in wartime… It was the beginning of the thinking soldiers’ army’ and Funnell has 
suggested that it was a ‘revolutionary innovation in the education of British army 
oicers and in the approach of the War Oice to army administration.’52 here is a good 
case to be made that the LSE Army Class attempted, and was partially successful, in 
initiating a management revolution within the administration of the Army.
51 Sloan, ‘Haldane’s Mackindergarten’, p.350.
52 D.R. Stoddart, ‘Geography and War: he “New Geography” and the “New Army” in 
England, 1889-1914’, Political Geography, Vol. 11, No. 1, (1992), pp.95-97. Funnell, 
‘National Eiciency’, p.736.
